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ABSTRACT
Users who care about their data store it in databases, which
(at least in principle) guarantee some form of transactional
isolation. However, experience shows [26, 24] that many
databases do not provide the isolation guarantees they claim.
With the recent proliferation of new distributed databases,
demand has grown for checkers that can, by generating client
workloads and injecting faults, produce anomalies that wit-
ness a violation of a stated guarantee. An ideal checker
would be sound (no false positives), efficient (polynomial
in history length and concurrency), effective (finding viola-
tions in real databases), general (analyzing many patterns
of transactions), and informative (justifying the presence of
an anomaly with understandable counterexamples). Sadly,
we are aware of no checkers that satisfy these goals.
We present Elle: a novel checker which infers an Adya-
style dependency graph between client-observed transactions.
It does so by carefully selecting database objects and oper-
ations when generating histories, so as to ensure that the
results of database reads reveal information about their ver-
sion history. Elle can detect every anomaly in Adya et al’s
formalism [2] (except for predicates), discriminate between
them, and provide concise explanations of each.
This paper makes the following contributions: we present
Elle, demonstrate its soundness, measure its efficiency against
the current state of the art, and give evidence of its effec-
tiveness via a case study of four real databases.
1. INTRODUCTION
Database systems often offer multi-object transactions at
varying isolation levels, such as serializable or read commit-
ted. However, design flaws or bugs in those databases may
result in weaker isolation levels than claimed. In order to
verify whether a given database actually provides claimed
safety properties, we can execute transactions against the
database, record a concurrent history of how those transac-
tions completed, and analyze that history to identify invari-
ant violations. This property-based approach to verification
is especially powerful when combined with fault injection
techniques. [29]
Many checkers use a particular pattern of transactions,
and check that under the expected isolation level, some
hand-proved invariant(s) hold. For instance, one could check
for long fork (an anomaly present in parallel snapshot isola-
tion) by inserting two records x and y in separate transac-
tions, and in two more transactions, reading both records. If
one read observes x but not y, and the other observes y but
not x, then we have an example of a long fork, and can con-
clude that the system does not provide snapshot isolation—
or any stronger isolation level.
These checkers are generally efficient (i.e. completing in
polynomial time), and do identify bugs in real systems, but
they have several drawbacks. They find a small number
of anomalies in a specific pattern of transactions, and tell
us nothing about the behavior of other patterns. They re-
quire hand-proven invariants: one must show that for cho-
sen transactions under a given consistency model, those in-
variants hold. They also do not compose: transactions we
execute for one checker are, in general, incompatible with
another checker. Each property may require a separate test.
Some researchers have designed more general checkers which
can analyze broader sets of possible transactions. For in-
stance, Knossos [22] and Porcupine [3] can verify whether
an arbitrary history of operations over a user-defined datatype
is linearizable, using techniques from Wing & Gong [37] and
Lowe [28]. Since strict-1SR is equivalent to linearizability
(where operations are transactions, and the linearizable ob-
ject is a map), these checkers can be applied to strict se-
rializable databases as well. While this approach does find
anomalies in real databases, its use is limited by the NP-
complete nature of linearizability checking, and the com-
binatorial explosion of states in a concurrent multi-register
system.
Serializability checking is also (in general) NP-complete [30]—
and unlike linearizability, one cannot use real-time constraints
to reduce the search space. Following the abstract exe-
cution formalism of Cerone, Bernardi, and Gotsman [12],
Kingsbury attempted to verify serializability by identify-
ing write-read dependencies between transactions, translat-
ing those dependencies to an integer constraint problem
on transaction orders [23], and applying off-the-shelf con-
straint solvers like Gecode [35] to solve for a particular
order. This approach works, but, like Knossos, is limited
by the NP-complete nature of constraint solving. Histories
of more than a hundred-odd transactions quickly become
intractable. Moreover, constraint solvers give us limited in-
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sight into why a particular transaction order was unsolv-
able. They can only tell us whether a history is serializable
or not, without insight into specific transactions that may
have gone wrong. Finally, this approach cannot distinguish
between weaker isolation levels, such as snapshot isolation
or read committed.
What would an ideal checker for transaction isolation look
like? Such a checker would accept many patterns of transac-
tions, rather than specific, hand-coded examples. It would
distinguish between different types of anomalies, allowing us
to verify stronger (e.g. strict-1SR) and weaker (e.g. read un-
committed) isolation levels. It ought to localize the faults it
finds to specific subsets of transactions. Of course, it should
do all of this efficiently.
In this paper, we present Elle: an isolation checker for
black-box databases. Instead of solving for a transaction
order, Elle uses its knowledge of the transactions issued
by the client, the objects written, and the values returned
by reads to reason about the possible dependency graphs of
the opaque database in the language of Adya’s formalism. [2]
While Elle can make limited inferences from read-write reg-
isters, it shines with richer datatypes, like append-only lists.
All history checkers depend on the system which generated
their transactions. Elle’s most powerful analysis requires
that we generate histories in which reads of an object corre-
spond return its entire version history, and where a unique
mapping exists between versions and transactions. How-
ever, we show that generating histories which allow these
inferences is straightforward, that the required datatypes
are broadly supported, and that these choices do not prevent
Elle from identifying bugs in real-world database systems.
2. THE ADYA FORMALISM
In their 2000 paper “Generalized Isolation Level Defini-
tions”, Adya, Liskov, and O’Neil formalized a variety of
transactional isolation levels in terms of proscribed behav-
iors in an abstract history H . Adya et al.’s histories (here-
after: ”Adya histories”) comprise of a set of transactions,
an event order which encodes the order of operations in
those transactions, and a version order ≪: a total order
over installed versions of each object. Two anomalies, G1a
(aborted reads) and G1b (intermediate reads), are defined as
transactions which read versions written by aborted trans-
actions, or which read versions from the middle of some
other transaction, respectively. The remainder are defined
in terms of cycles over a Direct Serialization Graph (DSG),
which captures the dependencies between transactions. Set-
ting aside predicates, Adya et al.’s dependencies are:
• Directly write-depends. Ti installs xi, and Tj in-
stalls x’s next version
• Directly read-depends. Ti installs xi, Tj reads xi
• Directly anti-depends. Ti reads xi, and Tj installs
x’s next version
The direct serialization graph DSG(H) is a graph over
transactions in some history H , whose edges are given by
these dependencies. A G0 anomaly is a cycle in the DSG
comprised entirely of write dependencies. G1c anomalies
include read dependencies. Instances of G2 involve at least
one anti-dependency (those with exactly one are G-single).
This is a tantalizing model for several reasons. Its defi-
nitions are relatively straightforward. Its anomalies are lo-
cal, in the sense that they involve a specific set of transac-
tions. We can point to those transactions and say, ”Things
went wrong here!”—which aids debugging. Moreover, we
can check these properties in linear time: intermediate and
aborted reads are straightforward to detect, and once we’ve
constructed the dependency graph, cycle detection is solv-
able in O(vertices + edges) time, thanks to Tarjan’s algo-
rithm for strongly connected components [34].
However, there is one significant obstacle to working with
an Adya history: we don’t have it. In fact, one may not
even exist. The database system may not have any con-
cept of a version order, or it might not expose that ordering
information to clients.
As an example, consider Adya et al.’s history Hserial, as
it would be observed by clients. Is this history serializable?
T1: w(z1), w(x1), w(y1), c
T2: r(x1), w(y2), c
T3: w(x3), r(y2), w(z3), c
T2 read x1, so it must read-depend on T1, and likewise,
T3 must read-depend on T2. What about T1 and T2’s writes
to y? Which overwrote the other? As Crooks et al observe
[17], we cannot tell, because we lack a key component in
Adya’s formalism: the version order. Hserial includes ad-
ditional information (x1 ≪ x3, y1 ≪ y2, z1 ≪ z3) which is
invisible to clients. We might consider deducing the version
order from the real-time order in which writes or commits
take place, but Adya et al explicitly rule this out, since opti-
mistic and multi-version implementations might require the
freedom to commit earlier versions later in time. Moreover,
network latency may make it impossible to precisely deter-
mine concurrency windows.
We would like to be able to infer an Adya history based
purely on the information available to clients of the system,
which we call an observation. When a client submits an
operation to a database, it generally knows what kind of
operation it performed (e.g. a read, a write, etc.), the object
that operation applies to, and the arguments it provided.
For instance, a client might write the value 5 to object x.
If the database returns a response for an operation, we may
also know a return value; for instance, that a read of x
returned the number 5.
Clients know the order of operations within every trans-
action. They may also know whether a transaction was def-
initely aborted, definitely committed, or could be either,
based on whether a commit request was sent, and how (or
if) the database acknowledged that request. Clients can also
record their own per-client and real-time orders of events.
This is not, in general, enough information to go on. Con-
sider a pair of transactions which set x to 1 and 2, respec-
tively. In the version order, does 1 or 2 come first? We can’t
say! Or consider an indeterminate transaction whose effects
are not observed. Did it commit? We have no way to tell.
This implies there might be many possible histories which
are compatible with a given observation. Are there condi-
tions under which only one history is possible? Or, if more
than one is possible, can we infer something about the struc-
ture of all of them which allows us to identify anomalies?
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We argue that yes: one can infer properties of every his-
tory compatible with a given observation, by taking advan-
tage of datatypes which allow us to trace the sequence of
versions which gave rise to a particular version of an object,
and which let us recover the particular writes which gave
rise to those versions. Next, we provide an intuition for how
this can be accomplished.
3. DEDUCING DEPENDENCIES
Consider a set of observed transactions interacting with
some read-write register x. One transaction Tj read x and
observed some version xi. Another transaction Ti wrote xi
to x. In general, we cannot tell whether Ti was the trans-
action which produced xi, because some other transaction
might have written xi as well. However, if we know that no
other transaction wrote xi, then we can recover the partic-
ular transaction which wrote xi: Ti. This allows us to infer
a direct write-read dependency: Ti <wr Tj .
If every value written to a given register is unique1, then
we can recover the transaction which gave rise to any ob-
served version. We call this property recoverability : every
version we observe can be mapped to a specific write in some
observed transaction.
Recoverability allows us to infer read dependencies. How-
ever, inferring write- and anti-dependencies takes more than
recoverability: we need the version order ≪. Read-write
registers make inferring ≪ impossible in general: if two
transactions set x to xi and xj respectively, we can’t tell
which came first.
In a sense, blind writes to a register “destroy history”.
If we used a compare-and-set operation, we could tell some-
thing about the preceding version, but a blind write can suc-
ceed regardless of what value was present before. Moreover,
the version resulting from a blind write carries no informa-
tion about the previous version. Let us therefore consider
richer datatypes, whose writes do preserve some information
about previous versions.
For instance, we could take increment operations on coun-
ters, starting at 0. If every write is an increment, then the
version history of a register should be something like (0, 1, 2,
. . . ). Given two transactions Ti and Tj , both of which read
object x, we can construct a read-read dependency Ti <rr Tj
if Ti’s observed value of x is smaller than Tj ’s. However, any
non-trivial increment history is non-recoverable, because we
can’t tell which increment produced a particular version.
This keeps us from inferring write-write, write-read, and
read-write dependencies. We could return the resulting ver-
sion from our writes, but this works only when the client
receives acknowledgement of its request(s).
What if we let our objects be sets of elements, and had
each write add a unique element to a given set? Like coun-
ters, this lets us recover read-read dependencies whenever
one version is a proper superset of another. Moreover, we
can recover some (but not all) write-write, write-read, and
read-write dependencies. Consider these observed transac-
tions:
T0: read(x, {0})
T1: add(x, 1)
1This approach is used by Crooks et al, and has a long
history in the literature.
T2: add(x, 2)
T3: read(x,{0, 1, 2})
Since {0, 1, 2} is a proper superset of {0}, we know that T3
read a higher version of x than T0, and can infer T0 <rr T3.
In addition, we can infer that T1 <wr T3 and T2 <wr T3,
since their respective elements 1 and 2 were both visible to
T3. Conversely, since T0’s read of 0 did not include 1 or 2, we
can infer that T0 <rw T1 and T0 <rw T2: anti-dependency
relations! We cannot, however, identify the write-write de-
pendency between T1 and T2: the database could have ex-
ecuted T1 and T2 in either order with equivalent effects,
because sets are order-free. Only a read of {0, 1} or {0, 2}
could resolve this ambiguity.
So, let’s add order to our values. Let each version be an
ordered list, and a write to x append a unique value to x.
Then any read of xi tells us the order of all versions writ-
ten prior: xi = [1, 2, 3] implies that x took on the versions
[], [1], [1, 2], and [1, 2, 3] in exactly that order. We call this
property traceability. Since appends add a unique element
to the end of x, we can also infer the exact write which gave
rise to any observed version: these versions are recoverable
as well.
As with counters and sets, we can use traceability to re-
construct read-read, write-read, and read-write dependencies—
but because we have the full version history, we can precisely
identify read-write and write-write dependencies for every
transaction whose writes were observed by some read. We
know, for instance, that the transaction which added 2 to
x must write-depend on the transaction which added 1 to
x, because we have a read of x wherein 1 immediately pre-
cedes 2. There may be some writes near the end of a history
which are never observed, but so long as histories are long
and include reads every so often, the unknown fraction of a
version order can be made relatively small.
Recoverability and traceability are the key to inferring
dependencies between observed transactions, but we have
glossed over the mapping between observed dependencies
and Adya histories, as well as the challenges arising from
aborted and indeterminate transactions. In the following
section, we discuss these issues more rigorously.
4. FORMAL MODEL
In this section we present our abstract model of databases
and transactional isolation. We establish the notions of
traceability and recoverability, which we prove to be suffi-
cient to reason directly from external observations to inter-
nal histories. We show that this approach is sound : that is,
any anomalies identified in an observation must be present
in any Adya history consistent with that observation.
Due to space considerations, we do not present the formal
definitions of traceability and recoverability or their accom-
panying proofs here; instead, we summarize these results.
4.1 Preliminaries
We begin our formalism by defining a model of a database,
transactions, and histories, closely adapted from Adya et
al. We omit predicates for simplicity, and generalize Adya’s
read-write registers to objects supporting arbitrary trans-
formations as writes, resulting in a version graph. We con-
strain Adya’s version order ≪ to be compatible with this
version graph. This generalization introduces a new class of
anomaly, dirty updates, which we define in Section 4.3.1.
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Object Versions xinit Writes
Register Any nil w(xi, a) −→ (a, nil)
Counter Integers 0 w(xi, a) −→ (xi + a, nil)
Set Add Sets {} w(xi, a) −→ (xi ∪ {a}, nil)
List Append Lists [] w([e1, . . . , en], a) −→ ([e1, . . . , en, a], nil)
Figure 1: Example objects.
4.1.1 Objects, Operations, Databases
An object x is a mutable datatype, consisting of a set of
versions2, written xi, xj , etc., an initial version, labeled
xinit, and a set of object operations.
An object operation represents a state transition between
two versions xi and xj of some object x. Object operations
take an argument a and produce a return value r. We write
this as f(x, xi, a) −→ (xj , r). Where the object, argument,
return value, or return tuple can be inferred from context
or are unimportant, we may omit them: f(xi, a) −→ (xj),
f(xi) −→ (xj), f(xi), etc.
Like Adya, we consider two types of operations: reads
(r) and writes (w). A read takes no argument, leaves the
version of the object unchanged, and returns that version:
r(xi, nil) −→ (xi, xi).
As we show in Figure 1, a write operation w changes a
version somehow. Write semantics are object-dependent.
Adya’s model (like much work on transactional databases)
assumes objects are registers, and that writes blindly replace
the current value. Our other three objects incorporate in-
creasingly specific dependencies on previous versions. In this
section we are primarily concerned with objects like list ap-
pend, but we provide definitions for the first three objects
as illustrative examples.
The versions and write operations on an object x together
yield a version graph vx: a directed graph whose vertices are
versions, and whose edges are write operations.
A database is a set of objects x, y, etc.
4.1.2 Transactions
A transaction is a list (a totally ordered set) of object op-
erations, followed by at most one commit or abort operation.
Transactions also include a unique identifier for disambigua-
tion.
We say a transaction is committed if it ends in a commit,
and aborted if it ends in an abort. We call the version result-
ing from a transaction’s last write to object x its final version
of x; any other writes of x result in intermediate versions.
If a transaction commits, we say it installs all final versions;
we call these installed versions. Unlike Adya, we use com-
mitted versions to refer to versions written by committed
transactions, including intermediate versions. Versions from
transactions which did not commit are called uncommitted
versions.
The initial version of every object is considered commit-
ted.
4.1.3 Histories
Per Adya et al, a history H comprises a set of transac-
tions T on objects in a database D, a partial order E over
2For simplicity, we assume versions are values, and that
versions do not repeat in a history.
operations in T , and a version order ≪ over versions of the
objects in D.
The event order E has the following constraints:
• It preserves the order of all operations within a trans-
action, including commit or abort events.
• One cannot read from the future: if a read r(xi) is
in E, then there must exist a write w −→ (xi) which
precedes it.
• Transactions observe their own writes: if a transaction
T contains w(xi) followed by r(xj), and there exists no
w(xk) between the write and read of xi in T , xi = xj .
• The history must be complete: if E contains a read or
write operation for a transaction Ti, E must contain a
commit or abort event for Ti.
The version order ≪ has two constraints, per Adya et al
• It is a total order over installed versions of each indi-
vidual object; there is no ordering of objects written by
uncommitted, aborted, or intermediate transactions.
• The version order for each object x (which we write
≪x) begins with the initial version xinit.
Driven by the intuition that the version order should be
consistent with the order of operations on an object, that
xi ≪ xj means xj overwrote xi, and that cycles in ≪ are
meant to capture anomalies like circular information flow,
we introduce an additional constraint that was not necessary
in Adya et al.’s formalism: the version order ≪ should be
consistent with the version graphs vx, vy, . . . .
Specifically, if xi ≪ xj , there exists a path from xi to xj
in vx. It would be odd if one appended 3 to the list [1, 2],
obtaining [1, 2, 3], and yet the database believed [1, 2, 3] ≪
[1, 2].
4.1.4 Dependency Graphs
We define write-write, read-write, and write-read depen-
dencies between transactions, adapted directly from Adya’s
formalism.
Finally, we (re-)define the Direct Serialization Graph us-
ing those dependencies. The anomalies we wish to find are
expressed in terms of that serialization graph.
• Direct write-write dependency. A transaction Tj
directly ww-depends on Ti if Ti installs a version xi of
x, and Tj installs x’s next version xj , by ≪.
• Direct write-read dependency. A transaction Tj
directly wr-depends on Ti if Ti installs some version xi
and Tj reads xi.
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• Direct read-write dependency. A transaction Tj
directly rw-depends on Ti if Ti reads version xi of x,
and Tj installs x’s next version in ≪.
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A Direct Serialization Graph, or DSG, is a graph of de-
pendencies between transactions. The DSG for a history H
is denoted DSG(H). If Tj ww-depends on Ti, there exists
an edge labeled ww from Ti to Tj in DSG(H), and similarly
for wr- and rw-dependencies.
4.1.5 Dirty Updates
Adya defines G1a: aborted read as a committed transac-
tion T2 containing a read of some value xi which was writ-
ten by an aborted transaction T1. However, our abstract
datatypes allow a transaction to commit a write which in-
corporates aborted state.
We therefore define a complementary phenomenon to G1a,
intended to cover scenarios in which information “leaks”
from uncommitted versions to committed ones via writes. A
history exhibits dirty update if it contains an uncommitted
transaction T1 which writes xi, and a committed transaction
T2 which contains a write acting on xi.
4.1.6 Traceable Objects, Version Orders and Version
Graphs
We now define a class of traceable objects, which permit
recovery of the version graph and object operations resulting
in any particular version.
Recall that for an object x, the version graph vx is com-
prised of versions connected by object operations. We call
a path in vx from xinit to some version xi a trace of xi.
Intuitively, a trace captures the version history of an object.
We say an object x is traceable if every version xi has
exactly one trace; i.e. vx is a tree.
Given a history with version order ≪, we call the largest
version of x (by ≪x) xmax. Because ≪ is a total order over
installed versions, and because a path in the version graph
exists between any two elements ordered by ≪, it follows
that every committed version of x is in the trace of xmax.
Moreover, for any installed version xi of x, we can recover
the prefix of ≪x up to and including xi simply by removing
intermediate and aborted versions from the trace of xi.
Restricting our histories to traceable objects (e.g., lists)
will allow us to directly reason about the version order ≪
using the results of individual read operations.
4.2 A Theory of Mind for Externally-Observed
Histories
When we interact with a database system, the history may
not be accessible from outside the database—or perhaps no
“real” history exists at all. We construct a formal “theory
of mind” which allows us to reason about potential Adya
histories purely from client observations.
We define an observation of a system as a set of experimentally-
accessible transactions where versions, return values, and
committed states may be unknown, and consider the inter-
pretations of that observation—the set of all histories which
could have resulted in that particular observation.
To be certain that an external observation constitutes an
irrefutable proof of an internal isolation anomaly requires
that observations have a unique mapping between versions
and observed transactions, a notion we call recoverability.
3It appears that Adya et al’s read dependencies don’t rule
out a transaction depending on itself. We preserve their
definitions here, but assume that in serialization graphs,
Ti 6= Tj .
We provide practical, sufficient conditions to produce recov-
erable histories.
4.2.1 Observations
Imagine a set of single-threaded logical processes which
interact with a database system as clients. Each process
submits transactions for execution, and may receive infor-
mation about the return values of the operations in those
transactions. What can we tell from the perspective of those
client processes?
Recall that an object operation has five components:
f(x, xi, a) −→ (xj , r) denotes an operation on object x which
takes version xi and combines it with argument a to yield
version xj , returning r. When a client makes a write, it
knows the object x and argument a, but (likely) not the
versions xi or xj . If the transaction commits, the client
may know the return value r, but might not if, for example,
a response message is lost by the network.
We define an observed object operation as an operation
whose versions and return value may be unknown. We write
observed operations with a hat: wˆ(x, , 3) −→ ( , nil) denotes
an observed write of 3 to object x, returning nil; the versions
involved are unknown. An observed operation is either an
observed object operation, a commit, or an abort.
An observed transaction, written Tˆi, is a transaction com-
posed of observed operations. If a client attempts to abort,
or does not attempt to commit, a transaction, the observed
transaction ends in an abort. If a transaction is known to
have committed, it ends in a commit operation. However,
when a client attempts to commit a transaction, but the re-
sult is unknown, e.g. due to a timeout or database crash,
we leave the transaction with neither a commit nor abort
operation.
AnObservation O represents the experimentally-accessible
information about a database system’s behavior. Observa-
tions have a set of observed transactions Tˆ . We assume ob-
servations include every transaction executed by a database
system. We say that O is determinate if every transaction
in Tˆ is either committed or aborted; e.g. there are no inde-
terminate transactions. Otherwise, O is indeterminate.
Consider the set Xc of versions of a traceable object x
read by committed transactions in some observation O. We
denote a single version with a trace longer than any other
xlongest—if there are multiple longest traces, any will do. We
say O is consistent if for all x in O, every xi ∈ Xc appears in
the trace of xlongest. Otherwise, O is inconsistent. We will
find xlongest helpful in inferring as much of ≪ as possible.
4.2.2 Interpretations
Intuitively, an observed operation oˆ could be a witness to
an “abstract” operation o if the two execute the same type
of operation on the same key with the same argument, and
their return values and versions don’t conflict. We capture
this correspondence in the notion of compatibility.
Consider an operation o = f(xi, a) −→ (xj , r) and an ob-
served operation oˆ = fˆ(xˆi, aˆ) −→ (xˆj , rˆ). We say that o is
compatible with oˆ iff:
• fˆ = f
• aˆ = a
• rˆ is either unknown or equal to r
• xˆi is either unknown or equal to xi
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• xˆj is either unknown or equal to xj
Wemay now define a notion of compatibility among trans-
actions that builds upon object compatibility. Consider an
abstract transaction Ti and an observed transaction Tˆi. We
say that Ti is compatible with Tˆi iff:
• They have the same number of object operations.
• Every object operation in Ti is compatible with its
corresponding object operation in Tˆi.
• If Ti committed, Tˆi is not aborted, and if Tˆi commit-
ted, Ti committed too.
• If Ti aborted, Tˆi is not committed, and if Tˆi aborted,
Ti aborted too.
Finally, we generalize the notion of compatibility to en-
tire histories and observations. Consider a history H and
an observation O, with transaction sets T and Tˆ respec-
tively. We say that H is compatible with O iff there exists
a one-to-one mapping R from Tˆ to T such that ∀(Tˆi, Ti) ∈
R, Ti is compatible with Tˆi. We call any (H,R) which sat-
isfies this constraint an interpretation of O. Given an inter-
pretation, we say that Ti = RTˆi is the corresponding trans-
action to Tˆi, and vice versa.
There may be many histories compatible with a given ob-
servation. For instance, an indeterminate observed trans-
action may either commit or abort in a compatible history.
Given two increment transactions T1 and T2 with identical
operations, there are two choices of R for any history H , cor-
responding to the two possible orders of T1 and T2. There
may also be many observations compatible with a given his-
tory: for instance, we could observe transaction T1’s com-
mit, or fail to observe it and label T1 indeterminate.
In each interpretation of an observation, every observed
transaction corresponds to a distinct abstract transaction
in that interpretation’s history, taking into account that we
may not know exactly what versions or return values were
involved, or whether or not observed transactions actually
committed. These definitions of compatible formalize an in-
tuitive ”theory of mind” for a database: what we think could
be going on behind the scenes.
4.2.3 Recoverability
Traceability allows us to derive version dependencies, but
in order to infer transaction dependencies, we need a way to
map between versions and observed transactions. We also
need a way to identify aborted and intermediate versions,
which means proving which particular write in a transaction
yielded some version(s). To do this, we exploit the definition
of reads, and a property relating versions to observed writes,
which we call recoverability.
The definition of a read requires that the pre-version, post-
version, and return value are all equal. This means for an
observed committed read, we know exactly what version it
observed—and conversely, given a version, we know which
reads definitely observed it.4 We say an observed transac-
tion Tˆi read xi when xi is returned in one of Tˆi’s reads. By
compatibility, every corresponding transaction Ti must also
have read xi.
Writes are more difficult, because in general multiple writes
could have resulted in a given version. For example, consider
4Indeterminate reads, of course, may have read different val-
ues in different interpretations.
two observed increment operations wˆ1 = w(x, , 1) −→ ( , nil)
and wˆ2 = w(x, , 1) −→ ( , nil). Which of these writes re-
sulted in, say, the version 2? It could be either wˆ1 or wˆ2.
We cannot construct a single transaction dependency graph
for this observation. We could construct a (potentially ex-
ponentially large) set of dependency graphs, and check each
one for cycles, but this seems expensive. To keep our analy-
sis computationally tractable, we restrict ourselves to those
cases where we can infer a single write, as follows.
Given an observation O and an object x with some version
xi, we say that xi is recoverable iff there is exactly one write
wˆi in O which is compatible with any write leading to xi
in the version graph vx. We call wˆi recoverable as well, and
say that xi must have been written by wˆi. Since there is
only one wˆi, there is exactly one transaction Tˆi in O which
performed wˆi.
Thanks to compatibility, any interpretation of O has ex-
actly one wi compatible with wˆi, again performed by a
unique transaction Ti. When a version is recoverable, we
know which single transaction performed it in every inter-
pretation.
We say a version xi is known-aborted if it is recoverable to
an aborted transaction, known-committed if it is recoverable
to a committed transaction, and known-intermediate if it
is recovered to a non-final write. By compatibility, these
properties apply not just to an observation O, but to every
interpretation of O.
We say an observation O is completely recoverable if every
write in O is recoverable. O is intermediate-recoverable if
every intermediate write in O is recoverable. O is trace-
recoverable if, for every x in O, x is traceable, and every
non-initial version in the trace of every committed read of x
is recoverable.
We can obtain complete recoverability for a register by
choosing unique arguments for writes. Counters and sets
are difficult to recover in general: a set like {1, 2} could have
resulted either from a write of 1 or 2.5 However, restrict-
ing observations to a single write per object makes recovery
trivial.
For traceable objects, we can guarantee an observation O
is trace-recoverable when O satisfies three criteria:
1. Every argument in the observed writes to some object
is distinct.
2. Given a committed read of xi, every argument to every
write in the trace of xi is distinct.
3. Given a committed read of xi, every write in the trace
of xi has a compatible write in O.
We can ensure the first criterion by picking unique val-
ues when we write to the database. We can easily detect
violations of the remaining two criteria, and each points
to pathological database behavior: if arguments in traces
are not distinct, it implies some write was somehow applied
twice; and if a trace’s write has no compatible write in O,
then it must have manifested from nowhere.
Similar conditions suffice for intermediate-recoverability.
With a model for client observations, interpretations of
those observations, and ways to map between versions and
5We can define a weaker notion of recoverability which iden-
tifies all writes in the causal past of some version, but we
lack space to discuss it here.
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observed operations, we are ready to infer the presence of
anomalies.
4.3 Soundness of Elle
We would like our checker to be sound : if it reports an
anomaly in an observation, that anomaly should exist in
every interpretation of that observation. We would also like
it to be complete: if an anomaly occurred in an history, we
should be able to find it in any observation of that history.
In this section, we establish the soundness of Elle formally,
and show how our approach comes close to guaranteeing
completeness.
The anomalies identified by Adya et al. can be broadly
split into two classes. Some anomalies involve transactions
operating on versions that they should not have observed, ei-
ther because an aborted transaction wrote them or because
they were not the final write of some committed transac-
tion. Our soundness proof must show that if one of these
anomalies is detected in an observation, it surely occurred
in every interpretation of that observation. Others involve
a cycle in the dependency graph between transactions; we
show that given an observation, we can can construct a de-
pendency graph which is a subgraph of every possible history
compatible with that observation. If we witness a cycle in
the subgraph, it surely exists in any compatible history.
We begin with the first class: non-cycle anomalies.
4.3.1 Non-Cycle Anomalies
We can use the definition of compatibility, along with
properties of traceable objects and recoverability, to infer
whether or not an observation implies that every interpreta-
tion of that observation contains aborted reads, intermediate
reads, or dirty updates.
Direct Observation Consider an observation O with a
known-aborted version xi. If xi is read by an observed com-
mitted transaction Tˆi, that read must correspond to a com-
mitted read of an aborted version in every interpretation of
O: an aborted read. A similar argument holds for interme-
diate reads.
Inconsistent Observations For traceable objects, we can
go further. If an observation O is inconsistent, it contains a
committed read of some version xi which does not appear in
the trace of xlongest. As previously discussed, all committed
versions of x must be in the trace of xmax. At most one of
xlongest or xi may be in this trace, so at least one of them
must be aborted.
Via Traces Consider a committed read of some value
xc whose trace contains a known-aborted version xa. Either
xc is aborted (an aborted read), or a dirty update exists be-
tween xa and xc. An similar argument allows us to identify
dirty updates when xc is the product of a known-committed
write. The closer xa and xc are in the version graph, the
better we can localize the anomaly.
Completeness The more recoverable a history is, and
the fewer indeterminate transactions it holds, the more non-
cycle anomalies we can catch. If an observation is determi-
nate and trace-recoverable, we know exactly which reads
committed in every interpretation, and exactly which writes
aborted, allowing us to identify every case of aborted read.
Finding every dirty update requires complete recoverability.
For an intermediate-recoverable observation O, we can
identify every intermediate read. We can do the same if O is
trace-recoverable. Let xi be a version read by a committed
read in O. Trace-recoverability ensures xi is recoverable to
a particular write, and we know from that write’s position
in its observed transaction whether it was intermediate or
not. Compatibility ensures all interpretations agree.
In practice, observations are rarely complete, but as we
show in section 7, we typically observe enough of a history
to detect the presence of non-cycle anomalies.
4.3.2 Dependency Cycles
The remainder of the anomalies identified by Adya et al.
are defined in terms of cycles in the dependency graph be-
tween transactions. Given an observation O, we begin by
inferring constraints on the version order ≪, then use prop-
erties of reads and recoverability to map dependencies on
versions into dependencies on transactions.
Inferred Version Orders Consider a intermediate-recoverable
observation O of a database composed of traceable objects6,
and an interpretation (H,R) of O. We wish to show that we
can derive part of H ’s version order ≪ from O alone, with
minimal constraints on H and R. Traceability allows us to
recover a prefix of ≪x from any installed xi in H , assum-
ing we know which transactions in the trace of xi commit-
ted, and which aborted. Let us assume H does not contain
aborted reads, intermediate reads, or dirty updates. We call
such a history clean.
Given O, which version of x should we use to recover
≪x? Ideally, we would have xmax. However, there could be
multiple interpretations of O with distinct xmax. Instead,
we take a version xf read by a transaction Tˆf such that:
• Tˆf is committed.
• Tˆf read xf before performing any writes to x.
• No other version of x satisfying the above properties
has a longer trace than xf .
We use xf to obtain an inferred version order <x that
is consistent with ≪x, as follows. First, we know that xf
corresponds to an installed version of x in H because H
contains no intermediate or aborted reads. By a similar ar-
gument, we also know that every version of x in the trace of
xf was written by a committed transaction. Therefore, if we
remove the intermediate versions in the trace of xf (which
we know, thanks to intermediate-recoverability), we are left
with a total order over committed versions that corresponds
directly to the prefix of ≪x up to and including xf .
We define < as the union of <x for all objects x.
Inferred Serialization Graphs Given an intermediate-
recoverable observation O of a database of traceable objects,
we can infer a chain of versions <x which is a prefix of ≪x,
for every object x in O. If O is trace-recoverable, we can
map every version in < to a particular write in O which
produced it, such that the corresponding write in every in-
terpretation of O produced that same version. Using these
relationships, we define inferred dependencies between pairs
of transactions Tˆi and Tˆj in O as follows:
• Direct inferred write-write dependency. A trans-
action Tˆj directly inferred-ww-depends on Tˆi if Tˆi per-
forms a final write of a version xi of x, and Tˆj performs
a final write resulting in x’s next version xj , by <.
6We can also derive weaker constraints on the version order
from non-traceable objects, which we leave as an exercise
for the reader.
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• Direct inferred write-read dependency. A trans-
action Tˆj directly inferred-wr-depends on Tˆi if Tˆi per-
forms a final write of a version xi in <, and Tˆj reads
xi.
• Direct inferred read-write dependency. A trans-
action Tˆj directly inferred-rw-depends on Tˆi if Tˆi reads
version xi of x, and Tˆj performs a final write of x’s
next version in <.
Unlike Adya et al’s definitions, we don’t require that a
transaction install some xi, because an indeterminate trans-
action in O might be committed in interpretations of O,
and have corresponding dependency edges there. Instead,
we rely on the fact that < only relates installed versions (in
clean interpretations).
An Inferred Direct Serialization Graph, or IDSG, is a
graph of dependencies between observed transactions. The
IDSG for an observation O is denoted IDSG(O). If Tˆj
inferred-ww-depends on Tˆi, there exists an edge labeled ww
from Tˆi to Tˆj in IDSG(O), and similarly for inferred-wr and
inferred-rw-dependencies.
All that remains is to show that for every clean interpre-
tation (H,R) of an observation, IDSG(O) is (in some sense)
a subgraph of DSG(H). However, the IDSG and DSG are
graphs over different types of transactions; we need the bi-
jection R to translate between them. Given a relation R
and a graph G, we write R⋄G to denote G with each vertex
v replaced by Rv.
The soundness proof for Elle first establishes that for
every clean interpretation (H,R) of a trace-recoverable ob-
servation O, R ⋄ IDSG(O) is a subgraph of DSG(H). The
proof proceeds by cases showing that for each class of de-
pendency, if a given edge exists in the IDSG, it surely exists
in every compatible DSG. We omit these details, which are
straightforward, in this paper.
For every anomaly defined in terms of cycles on a DSG
(e.g. G0, G1c, G-Single, G2, . . . ), we can now define a cor-
responding anomaly on an IDSG. If we detect that anomaly
in IDSG(O), its corresponding anomaly must be present in
every clean interpretation of O as well!
We present a soundness theorem for Elle below:
Theorem 1. Given a trace-recoverable observation O, if
Elle infers aborted reads, dirty updates, or intermediate
reads, then every interpretation of O exhibits correspond-
ing phenomena. If Elle infers a cycle anomaly, then every
clean interpretation of O exhibits corresponding phenomena.
Unclean Interpretations What of unclean interpreta-
tions, like those with aborted reads or dirty updates? If
those occurred, the trace of a version read by a commit-
ted transaction could cause us to infer a version order <x
which includes uncommitted versions, and is not a prefix of
≪x. A clean interpretation could have cycles absent from
an unclean interpretation, and vice versa.
Phenomena like aborted reads and dirty updates are, in
an informal sense, “worse” than dependency cycles like G1c
and G2. If every interpretation of an observation must ex-
hibit aborted reads, the question of whether it also exhibits
anti-dependency cycles is not as pressing! And if some in-
terpretations exist which don’t contain aborted reads, but
all of those exhibit anti-dependency cycles, we can choose
to give the system the benefit of the doubt, and say that it
definitely exhibits G2, but may not exhibit aborted reads.
Completeness The more determinate transactions an
observation contains, the more likely we are to definitively
detect anomalies. In special cases (e.g. when O is deter-
minate, completely-recoverable, etc.), we can prove com-
pleteness. In practice, we typically fail to observe the re-
sults of some transactions, and must fall back on probabilis-
tic arguments. In section 7 we offer experimental evidence
that Elle is complete enough to detect anomalies in real
databases.
5. INFERRING ADDITIONAL DEPENDEN-
CIES
We have argued that Elle can infer transaction depen-
dencies based on traceability and recoverability. In this sec-
tion, we suggest additional techniques for inferring the rela-
tionships between transactions and versions.
5.1 Transaction Dependencies
In addition to dependencies on values, we can infer addi-
tional dependencies purely from the concurrency structure
of a history. For instance, if process A performs T1 then
T2, we can infer that T1 <p T2. These dependencies en-
code a constraint akin to sequential consistency: each pro-
cess should (independently) observe a logically monotonic
view of the database. We can use these dependencies to
strengthen any consistency model testable via cycle detec-
tion. For instance, Berenson et al’s definition of snapshot
isolation [4] does not require that transaction start times-
tamps proceed in any particular order, which means that a
single process could observe, then un-observe, a write. If we
augment the dependency graph with per-process orders, we
can identify these anomalies, distinguishing between SI and
strong session SI [16].
Similarly, serializability makes no reference to real-time
constraints: it is legal, under Adya’s formalism, for every
read-only transaction to return an initial, empty state of
the database, or to discard every write-only transaction by
ordering it after all reads. Strict serializability [19] enforces a
real-time order: if transaction T1 completes before T2 begins,
T2 must appear to take effect after T1. We can compute
a transitive reduction of the realtime precedence order in
O(n · p) time, where n is the number of operations in the
history, and p is the number of concurrent processes, and
use it to detect additional cycles.
Some snapshot-isolated databases expose transaction start
and commit timestamps to clients. Where this information
is available, we can use it to infer the time-precedes order
used in Adya’s formalization of snapshot isolation [1], and
construct a start-ordered serialization graph.
5.2 Version Dependencies
Traceability on x allows us to infer a prefix of the ver-
sion order <x—but this does not mean that non-traceable
objects are useless! If we relax <x to be a partial order,
rather than total, and make some small, independent as-
sumptions about the behavior of individual objects, we can
recover enough version ordering information to detect cyclic
anomalies on less-informative datatypes, such as registers or
sets.
For instance, if we assume that the initial version xinit is
never reachable via any write, we can infer xinit <x xi for
every xi other than xinit. With registers, for example, we
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know that 1, 2, 3, etc. must all follow nil. When the number
of versions per object is small (or when databases have a
habit of incorrectly returning nil), this trivial inference can
be sufficient to find real-world anomalies.
If we assume that writes follow reads within a single trans-
action, we can link versions together whenever a transaction
reads, then writes, the same key, and that write is recov-
erable. For instance, T1 = r(xi), w(xj) allows us to infer
xi <x xj .
Many databases claim that each record is independently
linearizable, or sequentially consistent. After computing the
process or real-time precedence orders, we can use those
transaction relationships to infer version dependencies. If a
transaction finishes writing or reading a linearizable object
x at xi, then another transaction precedes to write or read
xj , we can infer (on the basis of per-key linearizability) that
xi <x xj .
Where databases expose version metadata to clients, we
can use that metadata to construct version dependency graphs
directly, rather than inferring the version order from values.
Since we can use transaction dependencies to infer version
dependencies, and version dependencies to infer transaction
dependencies, we can iterate these procedures to infer in-
creasingly complete dependency graphs, up to some fixed
point. We can then use the resulting transaction graph to
identify anomalies.
6. FINDING COUNTEREXAMPLES
These techniques allow us to identify several types of de-
pendencies between transactions: write-read, write-write,
and read-write relationships on successive versions of a single
object, process and real-time orders derived from the con-
currency structure of the history, and version and snapshot
metadata orders where databases offer them. We take the
union of these dependency graphs, with each edge labeled
with its dependency relationship(s), and search for cycles
with particular properties.
• G0: A cycle comprised entirely of write-write edges.
• G1c: A cycle comprised of write-write or write-read
edges.
• G-single: A cycle with exactly one read-write edge.
• G2: A cycle with one or more read-write edges.
Optionally, we may expand these definitions to allow pro-
cess, realtime, version, and/or timestamp dependencies to
count towards a cycle.
To find a cycle, we apply Tarjan’s algorithm to identify
strongly connected components [34]. Within each graph
component, we apply breadth-first search to identify a short
cycle.
To find G0 anomalies, we restrict the graph to only write-
write edges, which ensures that any cycle we find is purely
comprised of write dependencies. For G1c, we select only
write-write and write-read edges. G-single is trickier, be-
cause it requires exactly one read-write edge. We partition
the dependency graph into two subgraphs: one with, and
one without read-write edges. We find strongly connected
components in the full graph, but for finding a cycle, we be-
gin with a node in the read-write subgraph, follow exactly
one read-write edge, then attempt to complete the cycle us-
ing only write-write and write-read edges. This allows us to
identify cycles with exactly one read-write edge, should one
exist.
These cycles can be presented to the user as a witness of
an anomaly. We examine the graph edges between each pair
of transactions, and use those relationships to construct a
human-readable explanation for the cycle, and why it im-
plies a contradiction.
6.1 Additional Anomalies
As described in section 4.3.1, we can exploit recoverability
and traceability to directly detect aborted read, intermedi-
ate read, and dirty update. In addition, there are phenom-
ena which Adya et al.’s formalism does not admit, but which
we believe (having observed them in real databases) warrant
special verification:
• Garbage reads: A read observes a value which was
never written.
• Duplicate writes: The trace of a committed read
version contains a write of the same argument multiple
times.
• Internal inconsistency: A transaction reads some
value of an object which is incompatible with its own
prior reads and writes.
Garbage reads may arise due to client, network, or database
corruption, errors in serialization or deserialization, etc. Du-
plicate writes can occur when a client or database retries an
append operation; with registers, duplicate writes can mani-
fest as G1c or G2 anomalies. Internal inconsistencies can be
caused by improper isolation, or by optimistic concurrency
control which fails to apply a transaction’s writes to its local
snapshot.
7. IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDY
We have implemented Elle as a checker in the open-
source distributed systems testing framework Jepsen [25]
and applied it to four distributed systems, including SQL,
document, and graph databases. Elle revealed anomalies
in every system we tested, including G2, G-single, G1a, lost
updates, cyclic version dependencies, and internal inconsis-
tency. Almost all of these anomalies were previously un-
known. We have also demonstrated, as a part of Elle’s test
suite, that Elle can identify G0, G1b, and G1c anomalies,
as well as anomalies involving real-time and process orders.
Elle is straightforward to run against real-world databases.
Most transactional databases offer some kind of list with
append. The SQL standard’s CONCAT function and the TEXT
datatype are a natural choice for encoding lists, e.g. as
comma-separated strings. Some SQL databases, like Post-
gres, offer JSON collection types. Document stores typi-
cally offer native support for ordered collections. Even sys-
tems which only offer registers can emulate lists by perform-
ing a read followed by a write.
While list-append gives us the most precise inference of
anomalies, we can use the inference rules discussed in section
5 to analyze systems without support for lists. Wide rows
in Cassandra and predicates in SQL are a natural fit for
sets. Many systems have a notion of an object version num-
ber or counter datatype: we can detect cycles in both using
Elle. Even systems which offer only read-write registers
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Let:
T1 = {:value [[:append 250 10] [:r 253 [1 3 4]] [:r 255 [2 3 4 5]] [:append 256 3]], ...}
T2 = {:value [[:append 255 8] [:r 253 [1 3 4]]], ...}
T3 = {:value [[:append 256 4] [:r 255 [2 3 4 5 8]] [:r 256 [1 2 4]] [:r 253 [1 3 4]]], ...}
Then:
- T1 < T2, because T1 did not observe T2’s append of 8 to 255.
- T2 < T3, because T3 observed T2’s append of 8 to key 255.
- However, T3 < T1, because T1 appended 3 after T3 appended 4 to 256: a contradiction!
Figure 2: A textual explanation of an experimentally obtained real-time G-single cycle, as presented by our
checker.
Figure 3: The same cycle, as plotted by our checker.
Arrows show dependencies between transactions:
wr denotes a read dependency, rw denotes an anti-
dependency, and rt denotes a real-time ordering.
allow us to infer write-read dependencies directly, and ver-
sion orders can be (partially) inferred by write-follows-read,
process, and real-time orders.
In all our tests, we generated transactions of varying length
(typically 1-10 operations) comprised of random reads and
writes over a handful of objects. We performed anywhere
from one to 1024 writes per object; fewer writes per object
stresses codepaths involved in the creation of fresh database
objects, and more writes per object allows the detection of
anomalies over longer time periods.
We ran 10-30 client threads across 5 to 9 nodes, depend-
ing on the particular database under test. When a client
thread times out while committing a transaction (as is typ-
ical for fault-injection tests) Jepsen spawns a new logical
process for that thread to execute. This causes the logical
concurrency of tests to rise over time. Tens of thousands of
logically concurrent transactions are not uncommon.
Our implementation takes an expected consistency model
(e.g. strict-serializable) and automatically detects and re-
ports anomalies as data structures, visualizations, and human-
verifiable explanations of each cycle. For example, consider
the G-single anomaly in Figures 2 and 3.
7.1 TiDB
TiDB [32] is an SQL database which claims to provide
snapshot isolation, based on Google’s Percolator [31]. We
tested list append with SQL CONCAT over TEXT fields, and
found that versions 2.1.7 through 3.0.0-beta.1 exhibited fre-
quent anomalies—even in the absence of faults. For exam-
ple, we observed the following trio of transactions:
T1: r(34, [2, 1]), append(36, 5), append(34, 4)
T2: append(34, 5)
T3: r(34, [2, 1, 5, 4])
T1 did not observe T2’s append of 5 to key 34, so T2 must
rw-depend on T1. However, T3’s read implies T1’s append of
4 to key 34 followed T2’s append of 5, so T1 ww-depends on
T2. This cycle contains exactly one anti-dependency edge, so
it is a case of G-single: read skew. We also found numerous
cases of inconsistent observations (implying aborted reads)
as well as lost updates.
These cases stemmed from an automated transaction retry
mechanism: when one transaction conflicted with another,
TiDB simply re-applied the transaction’s writes again, ig-
noring the conflict. This feature was enabled by default.
Turning it off revealed the existence of a second, undocu-
mented retry mechanism, also enabled by default. Version
3.0.0-rc2 resolved these issues by disabling both retry mech-
anisms by default.
Furthermore, TiDB’s engineers claimed that select ...
for update prevented write skew. Elle demonstrated that
G2 anomalies including write skew were still possible, even
when all reads used select ... for update. TiDB’s lock-
ing mechanism could not express a lock on an object which
hadn’t been created yet, which meant that freshly inserted
rows were not subject to concurrency control. TiDB has
documented this limitation.
7.2 YugaByte DB
YugaByte DB [21] is a serializable SQL database based
on Google’s Spanner [14]. We evaluated version 1.3.1 us-
ing CONCAT over TEXT fields, identified either by primary or
secondary keys, both with and without indices. We found
that when master nodes crashed, paused, or otherwise be-
came unavailable to tablet servers, those tablet servers could
exhibit a handful of G2-item anomalies. For instance, this
cycle (condensed for clarity), shows two transactions which
fail to observe each other’s appends:
T1: . . . append(3, 837) . . . r(4, [ . . . 874, 877, 883])
T1: . . . append(4, 885) . . . r(3, [ . . . 831, 833, 836])
Every cycle we found involved multiple anti-dependencies;
we observed no cases of G-single, G1, or G0. YugaByte
DB’s engineers traced this behavior to a race condition: af-
ter a leader election, a fresh master server briefly advertised
an empty capabilities set to tablet servers. When a tablet
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server observed that empty capabilities set, it caused ev-
ery subsequent RPC call to include a read timestamp. Yu-
gaByte DB should have ignored those read timestamps for
serializable transactions, but did not, allowing transactions
to read from inappropriate logical times. This issue was
fixed in 1.3.1.2-b1.
7.3 FaunaDB
FaunaDB [20] is a deterministic, strict-serializable doc-
ument database based on Calvin [36]. It offers native list
datatypes, but the client we used had no list-append function—
we used strings with concat instead. While FaunaDB claimed
to provide (up to) strict serializability, we detected internal
inconsistencies in version 2.6.0, where a single transaction
failed to observe its own prior writes:
T1: append(0, 6), r(0, nil)
These internal inconsistencies also caused Elle to infer
G2 anomalies. Internal anomalies occurred frequently, un-
der low contention, in clusters without any faults. However,
they were limited to index reads. Fauna believes this could
be a bug in which coordinators fail to apply tentative writes
to a transaction’s view of an index.
7.4 Dgraph
Dgraph [27] is a graph database with a homegrown trans-
action protocol influenced by Shacham, Ohad et al. [33]
Dgraph’s data model is a set of entity-attribute-value triples,
and it has no native list datatype. However, it does lend it-
self naturally to registers, which we analyzed with Elle.
We evaluated Dgraph version 1.1.1, which claimed to offer
snapshot isolation, plus per-key linearizability.
Like FaunaDB, Dgraph transactions failed to provide
internal consistency under normal operation: reads would
fail to observe previously read (or written!) values. This
transaction, for instance, set key 10 to 2, then read an earlier
value of 1.
T1: w(10, 2), r(10, 1)
To find cycles over registers, we allowed Elle to infer par-
tial version orders from the initial state, from writes-follow-
reads within individual transactions, and (since Dgraph
claims linearizable keys) from the real-time order of opera-
tions. These inferred dependencies were often cyclic—here,
transaction T1 finished writing key 540 a full three seconds
before T2 began, but T2 failed to observe that write:
T1: r(541, nil), w(540, 2)
T2: r(540, nil), w(544, 1)
Elle automatically reports and discards these inconsis-
tent version orders, to avoid generating trivial cycles, but it
went on to identify numerous instances of read skew, both
with and without real-time edges:
T1: r(2432, 10), r(2434, nil)
T2: w(2434, 10)
T3: w(2432, 10), r(2434, 10)
These cycles stemmed from a family of bugs in Dgraph
related to shard migration: transactions could read from
freshly-migrated shards without any data in them, returning
nil. Dgraph Labs is investigating these issues.
7.5 Performance
Elle’s performance on real-world workloads was excel-
lent; whereKnossos (Jepsen’s main linearizability checker)
often timed out or ran out of memory after a few hundred
transactions, Elle was able to check histories of hundreds
of thousands of transactions in tens of seconds. To confirm
this behavior experimentally, we designed a history gener-
ator which simulates clients interacting with an in-memory
serializable-snapshot-isolated database, and analyzed those
histories with both Elle and Knossos.
Our histories were composed of randomly generated trans-
actions performing one to five operations each, interacting
with any of 100 possible objects at any point in time. We
performed 100 appends per object. We generated histories
of different lengths, and with varying numbers of concurrent
processes, and measured both Elle and Knossos’ runtime.
Since many Knossos runs involved search spaces on the or-
der of 1024, we capped runtimes at 100 seconds. All tests
were performed on a 24-core Xeon with 128 GB of ram.
As figure 4 shows, Knossos’ runtime rises dramatically
with concurrency: given c concurrent transactions, the num-
ber of permutations to evaluate is c!. Symmetries and prun-
ing reduce the state space somewhat, but the problem re-
mains fundamentally NP-complete. With 40+ concurrent
processes, even histories of 5000 transactions were (gener-
ally) uncheckable in reasonable time frames. Of course, run-
time rises with history length as well.
Elle does not exhibit Knossos’ exponential runtimes: it
is primarily linear in the length of a history. Building in-
dices, checking for consistent orders, looking for internal and
aborted reads, constructing the inferred serialization graph,
and detecting cycles are all linear-time operations. Unlike
Knossos, concurrency does not have a strong impact on
Elle. With only one process, every transaction commits.
As concurrency rises, some transactions abort due to con-
flicts, which mildly reduces the number of transactions we
have to analyze. At high concurrency, more transactions
interact with the same versions, and we infer more depen-
dencies.
8. RELATED WORK
As we discuss in Section 1, there has been a significant
amount of work on history checkers in the concurrent pro-
gramming community. As early as 1993, Wing & Gong [37]
simulated executions of linearizable objects to record con-
current histories, and described a checker algorithm which
could search for bugs in those histories. Line-Up [9], Knos-
sos [22], and Lowe’s linearizability checker [28] follow simi-
lar strategies. Gibbons & Korach showed [18] that sequen-
tial consistency checking was NP-complete via reduction to
SAT.
Generating random operations, applying them to some
implementation of a datatype, and checking that the re-
sulting history obeys certain invariants is a key concept in
generative, or property-based testing. Perhaps the most well-
known implementation of this technique isQuickCheck [13],
and Jepsen applies a similar approach to distributed sys-
tems [24]. Majumdar & Niksic argued probabilistically for
the effectiveness of this randomized testing approach [29],
which helps explain why our technique finds bugs.
Brutschy et al. propose both a static [8] and a trace-
based dynamic [7] analysis to find serializability violations in
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programs run atop weakly-consistent stores. Quite recently,
Biswas & Enea provided polynomial-time checkers for read
committed, read atomic, and causal consistency, as well as
exponential-time checkers for prefix consistency, snapshot
isolation, and serializability. [6]
Using graphs to model dependencies among transactions
has a long history in the database literature. The depen-
dency graph model was first proposed by Bernstein [5, 4]
and later refined by Adya [2, 1]. Dependency graphs have
been applied to the problem of safely running transactions
at a mix of isolation levels [17] and to the problem of run-
time concurrency control[11, 38], in addition to reasoning
formally about isolation levels and anomalous histories.
As attractive as dependency graphs may be as a foun-
dation for database testing, they model orderings among
object versions and operations that are not necessarily vis-
ible to external clients. Instead of defining isolation levels
in terms of internal operations, some declarative definitions
of isolation levels [12, 10] are based upon a pair of com-
patible dependency relations: a visibility relation capturing
the order in which writes are visible to transactions and an
arbitration relation capturing the order in which writes are
committed.
The client-centric formalism of Crooks et al. [15] goes a
step further, redefining consistency levels strictly in terms of
client-observable states. While both approaches, like ours,
enable reasoning about existing isolation levels from the
outside of the database implementation, our goal is some-
what different. We wish instead to provide a faithful map-
ping between externally-observable events and Adya’s data-
centric definitions, which have become a lingua franca in the
database community. In so doing, we hope to build a bridge
between two decades of scholarship on dependency graphs
and emerging techniques for black-box database testing.
9. FUTURE WORK & CONCLUSIONS
Future Work There are some well-known anomalies,
like long fork, which Elle detects but tags as G2. We believe
it should be possible to provide more specific hints to users
about what anomalies are present. Ideally, we would like to
tell a user exactly which isolation levels a given history does
and does not satisfy.
Our approach ignores predicates and deals only in indi-
vidual objects; we cannot distinguish between repeatable
read and serializability. Nor can we detect anomalies like
predicate-many-preceders. We would like to extend our model
to represent predicates, and prove how to infer dependencies
on them. One could imagine a system which somehow gen-
erates a random predicate P , in such a way that any version
of an object can be classified as in P or not, and then using
that knowledge to generate dependency edges for predicate-
based reads.
Conclusions We present Elle: a novel theory and tool
for experimental verification of transactional isolation. By
using datatypes and generating histories which couple the
version history of the database to client-observable reads
and writes, we can extract rich dependency graphs between
transactions. We can identify cycles in this graph, categorize
them as various anomalies, and present users with concise,
human-readable explanations as to why a particular set of
transactions implies an anomaly has occurred.
Elle is sound. it identifies G0, G1a, G1b, G1c, G-single,
and G2 anomalies, as well as inferring cycles involving per-
process and real-time dependencies. In addition, it can iden-
tify dirty updates, garbage reads, duplicated writes, and
internal consistency violations. When Elle identifies an
anomaly in an observation of database, it must be present
in every interpretation of that observation.
Elle is efficient. It is linear in the length of a history
and effectively constant with respect to concurrency. It can
quickly analyze real-world histories of hundreds of thousands
of transactions, even when processes crash leading to high
logical concurrency. We see no reason why it cannot handle
more. It is dramatically faster than linearizability check-
ers [22] and constraint-solver serializability checkers [23].
Elle is effective. It has found anomalies in every database
we’ve checked, ranging from internal inconsistency and aborted
reads to anti-dependency cycles.
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Elle is general. Unlike checkers which hard-code a par-
ticular example of an anomaly (e.g. long fork), Elle works
with arbitrary patterns of writes and reads over different
types of objects, so long as those objects and transactions
satisfy some simple properties: traceability and recoverabil-
ity. Generating random histories with these properties is
straightforward; list append is broadly supported in trans-
actional databases. Elle can also make limited inferences
from less informative datatypes, such as registers, counters,
and sets.
Elle is informative. Unlike solver-based checkers, Elle’s
cycle-detection approach produces short witnesses of spe-
cific transactions. Moreover, it provides a human-readable
explanation of why each witness must be an instance of the
claimed anomaly.
We are aware of no other checker which combines these
properties. Using Elle, testers can write a small test which
verifies a wealth of properties against almost any database.
The anomalies Elle reports can rule out (or tentatively
support) that database’s claims for various isolation levels.
Moreover, each witness points to particular transactions at
particular times, which helps engineers investigate and fix
bugs. We believe Elle will make the database industry
safer.
9.1 Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Asha Karim for discussions
leading to Elle, and Kit Patella for her assistance in build-
ing the Elle checker.
10. REFERENCES
[1] A. Adya. Weak consistency: A generalized theory and
optimistic implementations for distributed
transactions. Technical report, MIT, 1999.
[2] A. Adya, B. Liskov, and P. E. O’Neil. Generalized
Isolation Level Definitions. ICDE’00, 2000.
[3] A. Athalye. Porcupine.
https://github.com/anishathalye/porcupine,
2017-2018.
[4] P. A. Bernstein, P. A. Bernstein, and N. Goodman.
Concurrency Control in Distributed Database
Systems. ACM Computing Survey, 13(2), 1981.
[5] P. A. Bernstein, D. W. Shipman, and W. S. Wong.
Formal Aspects of Serializability in Database
Concurrency Control. IEEE Transactions on Software
Engineering, 5(3), 1979.
[6] R. Biswas and C. Enea. On the complexity of checking
transactional consistency. Proceedings of the ACM on
Programming Languages, 3(OOPSLA), 2019.
[7] L. Brutschy, D. Dimitrov, P. Mu¨ller, and M. Vechev.
Serializability for Eventual Consistency: Criterion,
Analysis, and Applications. POPL 2017, 2017.
[8] L. Brutschy, D. Dimitrov, P. Mu¨ller, and M. Vechev.
Static Serializability Analysis for Causal Consistency.
PLDI 2018, 2018.
[9] S. Burckhardt, C. Dern, M. Musuvathi, and R. Tan.
Line-up: A Complete and Automatic Linearizability
Checker. PLDI ’10, 2010.
[10] S. Burckhardt, D. Leijen, M. Fa¨hndrich, and
M. Sagiv. Eventually consistent transactions. In ESOP
2012, 2012.
[11] M. J. Cahill, U. Ro¨hm, and A. D. Fekete. Serializable
Isolation for Snapshot Databases. ACM Transactions
on Database Systems, 34(4), 2009.
[12] A. Cerone, G. Bernardi, and A. Gotsman. A
Framework for Transactional Consistency Models with
Atomic Visibility. In 26th International Conference on
Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2015), 2015.
[13] K. Claessen and J. Hughes. QuickCheck: A
Lightweight Tool for Random Testing of Haskell
Programs. ICFP ’00, 2000.
[14] J. C. Corbett, J. Dean, M. Epstein, A. Fikes, C. Frost,
J. Furman, S. Ghemawat, A. Gubarev, C. Heiser,
P. Hochschild, et al. Spanner: Google’s
globally-distributed database. In Proceedings of OSDI,
volume 1, 2012.
[15] N. Crooks, Y. Pu, L. Alvisi, and A. Clement. Seeing is
Believing: A Client-Centric Specification of Database
Isolation. PODC ’17, 2017.
[16] K. Daudjee and K. Salem. Lazy database replication
with snapshot isolation. VLDB ’06, 2006.
[17] A. Fekete. Allocating Isolation Levels to Transactions.
PODS ’05, 2005.
[18] P. B. Gibbons and E. Korach. Testing shared
memories. SIAM Journal on Computing, 26(4), 1997.
[19] M. P. Herlihy and J. M. Wing. Linearizability: A
Correctness Condition for Concurrent Objects. ACM
Transactions on Programming Languages and
Systems, 12(3), 1990.
[20] F. Inc. Faunadb. https://fauna.com, 2019.
[21] Y. Inc. Yugabyte db. https://yugabyte.com, 2019.
13
[22] K. Kingsbury. Knossos.
https://github.com/jepsen-io/knossos, 2013-2019.
[23] K. Kingsbury. Gretchen.
https://github.com/aphyr/gretchen , 2016.
[24] K. Kingsbury and K. Patella. Jepsen (reports).
http://jepsen.io/analyses, 2013-2019.
[25] K. Kingsbury and K. Patella. Jepsen (software
library). https://github.com/jepsen-io/jepsen,
2013-2019.
[26] M. Kleppmann. Hermitage: Testing transaction
isolation levels. https://github.com/ept/hermitage ,
2014-2019.
[27] D. Labs. Dgraph. https://dgraph.io, 2020.
[28] G. Lowe. Testing and Verifying Concurrent Objects.
Concurrency and Computation: Practice and
Experience, 29(4), 2017.
[29] R. Majumdar and F. Niksik. Why is Random Testing
Effective for Partition Tolerance Bugs. POPL 2018,
2018.
[30] C. H. Papadimitriou. The serializability of concurrent
database updates. Journal of the Association for
Computing Machinery, 26(4), 1979.
[31] D. Peng and F. Dabek. Large-scale incremental
processing using distributed transactions and
notifications. In OSDI, 2010.
[32] PingCAP. Tidb. https://pingcap.com/en, 2019.
[33] O. Shacham, F. Perez-Sorrosal, E. Bortnikov,
E. Hillel, I. Keidar, I. Kelly, M. Morel, and
S. Paranjpye. Omid, Reloaded: Scalable and Highly
Available Transaction Processing. USENIX
Conference on File and Store Technologies, 2017.
[34] R. Tarjan. Depth-first Search and Linear Graph
Algorithms. SWAT ’71, 1971.
[35] G. Team. Gecode: Generic constraint development
environment. https://www.gecode.org/, 2005.
[36] A. Thomson, T. Diamond, S.-C. Weng, K. Ren,
P. Shao, and D. J. Abadi. Calvin: Fast Distributed
Transactions for Partitioned Database Systems.
SIGMOD ’12, 2012.
[37] J. M. Wing and C. Gong. Testing and Verifying
Concurrent Objects. Journal of Parallel and
Distributed Computing, 17(1-2), 1993.
[38] C. Yao, D. Agrawal, P. Chang, G. Chen, B. C. Ooi,
W. Wong, and M. Zhang. DGCC: A new dependency
graph based concurrency control protocol for multicore
database systems. CoRR, abs/1503.03642, 2015.
14
